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1
One of the main objectives of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to facilitate 
international trade. Harmonisation is a well-known instrument for implementing this 
goal, i.e. through common international standards established by organisations like the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). According to WTO rules, regulations shall be based on interna-
tional standards (when such exist). The ultimate goal of harmonisation is to make all 
trade related measures uniform worldwide. 
Equivalence and mutual recognition are two other trade-facilitating tools, which may 
not have attained the same degree of attention as harmonisation. The purpose of this 
paper is to focus on equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-facilitating tools in 
relation to technical measures. 
Equivalence is a concept explicitly recognised in two WTO agreements, namely The 
SPS Agreement (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures) and the TBT Agreement (Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade). The 
concept of mutual recognition is only treated in the TBT Agreement. The relevant 
provisions in both agreements will be discussed. Recognition of equivalence seems to 
be more common in relation to SPS measures than for TBT measures. By comparing 
how these agreements treat the concept of equivalence, we hope to shed some light on 
possible differences to explain why this might be the case. After sorting out the 
concepts, we shall present some illustrating examples of actual agreements involving 
equivalence and mutual recognition in relation to technical measures. Hopefully, this 
can lead to better comprehension of equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-
facilitating tools, which in turn may reveal interesting questions and possible problems 
regarding the establishment of equivalence agreements and mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs). 
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1
One of the main goals of the TBT Agreement, as stated in its preamble, is facilitating 
the conduct of international trade by ensuring that technical standards2, regulations and 
procedures for assessment of conformity with these regulations and standards, do not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade.  
Equivalence is treated in the TBT Agreement as one important mean to facilitate 
trade.  
In relation to technical regulations, article 2.7 states that3: ³Members shall give 
positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other 
Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied 
                                                 
1 The TBT agreement covers technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures for 
all product categories, including industrial and agricultural products. All types of technical measures are 
regulated by the TBT agreement, except for those measures designed to protect human, animal or plant 
health that are covered by the SPS agreement (for the definition of SPS measures, consult Annex A (1) of 
the SPS agreement).  
 
2 In annex I of the TBT agreement, standards are defined as: ³document approved by a recognised body, 
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related 
processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method´. 
 
3 In annex I of the TBT agreement, technical regulations are defined as: ³document which lays down 
product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable 
provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with termino-
logy, symbols, packing, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or produc-
tion method´. 
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that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations´ 
(underlining by the author). 
The TBT Agreement does not give any further guidance on how the concept of 
equivalence in relation to regulations should be understood or how it works in practice.  
However, from article 2.7 one may deduce the following: to make an assessment of 
equivalence possible, the goals of the regulations must first be (made) explicit. If the 
goals are considered the same/equivalent, then the next step would be to perform the 
crucial test: whether the outcomes/results of the regulations can be considered 
equivalent. As long as this is the case, differences, e.g. with respect to the means 
prescribed to achieve the goals, should be accepted.  
Consequently, an equivalence approach allows for different rules, but treating them 
as equal after making sure they fulfil the same regulatory goals and produce the same 
results. This would in practise lead to the same results as harmonisation. In contrast, 
harmonisation implies that the two different regulations are converted into one identical 
set of rules.  
There is no specific provision with regard to equivalence and standards in the TBT 
Agreement. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the recognition of equivalence 
with regard to national standards would be relevant in situations where no international 
standard exist or when awaiting an international standard to be finalised. Then, national 
standards could be accepted as equivalent insofar as they are found to be sufficiently 
similar in relation to both their objectives and the effects they promote.  
However, article 6.1 of the TBT Agreement makes it clear that the principle of 
equivalence can apply also to conformity assessment procedures. Conformity assess-
ment procedures are defined in Annex I of the agreement as: ³any procedure used, 
directly or indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations 
or standards are fulfilled´4. 
In other words, the concept of conformity assessment procedures describes all kinds 
of procedures to check compliance with relevant standards and regulations. 
Article 6.1 states that: ³Members shall ensure, whenever possible, that results of 
conformity assessment procedures of other Members are accepted, even when those 
procedures differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that those procedures offer 
an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or standards equiva-
lent to their own procedures.´ (underlining by the author). 
It is clear that the equivalence assessment in relation to conformity assessment 
procedures is directed at the results of the compliance check itself and not at the rules or 
standards they check the compliance of. The absolute criterion for recognition of 
equivalence is that the conformity assessment procedures of the other party must offer 
the same degree of assurance of conformity with applicable regulations and standard as 
their own procedures ± even if the procedures differ.5  
Article 6.1 of the TBT Agreement recognises the need for prior consultations 
between the parties in relation to establishing equivalence of conformity assessment 
procedures. However, an important element of the consultations mentioned in article 
6.1.1, is the assessment of the competence of conformity assessment bodies e.g., 
through accreditation with international guides or standardising bodies. The parties may 
                                                 
 4 More specific provisions on conformity assessment procedures are to be found in Article 5 of the TBT 
agreement. 
  
 5 The definition of equivalence of The Codex Alimentarius Commission is focused on conformity assess-
ment procedures (inspection and certification) and their results: ³Equivalence is the capability of different 
inspection and certification systems to achieve the same objectives, regardless of details related to 
methods applied by both systems´(CAC GL 2-199). 
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accept each other¶s certificates, marks or test reports after thoroughly examining 
whether the performance of the conformity assessment bodies complies with the 
requirements of international standards or guides (for instance the requirements to get 
ISO accreditation). 
The TBT Agreement has a special provision requesting members to establish Mutual 
Recognition Agreements of the result of conformity assessment procedures: ³Members 
are encouraged, at the request of other Members, to be willing to enter into negotia-
tions for the conclusion of agreements for the mutual recognition of results of other¶s 
conformity assessment procedures«..´ (Cf. Art. .) (underlining by the author).  
The concept of mutual recognition agreements ± MRAs ± is related to accepting the 
results of each other¶s conformity assessment procedures. This means that MRAs are 
formal agreements recognising that the conformity assessment procedures of the parties 
are equivalent with regard to the results they produce. 
Mutual recognition agreements can give the exporting country the right to perform 
conformity assessment according to the rules/standards of the importing country. This 
means that products can be approved before export in the country of production and that 
there will be no need to check conformity with the rules of the importing country again 
at arrival.  
As mentioned above, it is clear that equivalence with regard to conformity assess-
ment procedures is an acceptance of the results of the compliance checks and not the 
standards and rules they check. Consequently, it follows that mutual recognition 
agreements can be established irrespectively of whether regulations and standards are 
harmonised or found to be equivalent or not. The fact that regulations and standards of 
the parties are not harmonised or found to be equivalent, would not be relevant, since 
the MRA implies that conformity assessment nevertheless can be done in the exporting 
country. Moreover, the status of the exporting country¶s standards and rules would not 
be affected. 
However, producers in the exporting country would still have to modify their 
products in accordance with two different sets of rules. The benefit of the MRA is that 
the countries in question can have their products tested and certified through a ³one 
stop´ control at one local/national agency, both for products aimed at the national 
market and for products aimed at foreign markets. 
If rules and standards of the parties are harmonised or found to be equivalent, the 
producers¶ costs of adapting to different set of rules would be eliminated. But even if 
recognition of the equivalence of rules and standards is reached, it does not automati-
cally give market access in terms of product approvals. Only mutual recognition of 
conformity assessment procedures enables the products to be certified in the country of 
export.  
In the previous section we established the difference between harmonisation, 
equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-facilitating tools. An important question 
then is: Which trade-facilitating tool should have priority and under what circum-
stances?  
Generally, harmonisation is considered the preferred tool in the sense that a general 
goal in international trade is to establish the same regulations, standards and procedures 
worldwide. However, to reach this stage of harmonisation is not an easy task. Parallel to 
the process of harmonisation, the use of equivalence and mutual recognition could 
prove very useful.  
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If the main problem is the high cost of industry¶s adoption to different national 
standards and regulations, harmonisation or recognition of equivalence of rules and 
standards would be the right tools to choose. Producers would thus only have to relate 
to one set of rules either on the basis that rules are harmonised or that rules are found to 
be equivalent (products can be placed on the market as if they conformed to the rules of 
the importing country).  
If this is not a feasible strategy, or if the problems are not primarily related to the 
costs of adapting to different rules but to product approvals, priority should be given to 
the establishment of mutual recognition agreements to facilitate the process of confor-
mity assessment.  
MRAs save time and expenses by allowing national inspectors to do the conformity 
assessment job all together, particularly when operating in heavily regulated sectors 
where testing is carried out both prior or post export, where there is unpredictability in 
obtaining approvals, where markets are distant and where rejections create delays and 
necessitate additional shipping or other costs, or when early marketing is crucial for the 
competitiveness of a product (European Commission 1996). 
MRAs facilitate import administrative measures, speeding up customs clearance and 
reducing the rate of rejections of goods. MRAs will reduce the distance between the 
manufacturer and the conformity assessment body, and the importing country saves 
monitoring resources in terms of financial and personnel resources spent on end-product 
testing and certification.  
However, being able to pursue a double-track strategy through both harmonisation 
and equivalence of rules and standard and establishing mutual recognition agreements 
of conformity assessment procedures, would give the greatest benefits. This strategy 
would ensure the reduction or elimination of the cost of adapting to different rules and 
the costs related to product approvals (European Commission 2001). 
It should also be noted that both equivalence of rules and standards and mutual 
recognition will lead to increased market access, transparency and confidence building 
between the parties. Co-operation between the parties will be closer, leading to more 
efficient problem solving when necessary. The use of equivalence and MRAs as trade-
facilitating tools will also promote harmonisation in the long run. 
In conclusion, the choice of trade facilitating tools depends heavily on how close the 
systems of rules, standards and procedures of different countries in different sectors are 
brought together and on what the most urgent problems are.  
Generally, equivalence has gained more attention and acceptance in relation to SPS 
issues than for TBT issues. We shall therefore take a look at the relevant provisions of 
the SPS Agreement in order to compare the way in which the concept is dealt with in 
the two agreements.  
Article 4.1 is the ³equivalence provision´ of the SPS Agreement stating that: ³even if 
measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members trading in the 
same product, Members shall accept the SPS measures of other Members as equivalent 
when the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its 
measures achieve the importing Member¶s appropriate level of SPS 
protection´(underlining by the author). 
Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement refers to the broad term ³measures´, while the 
TBT Agreement has one equivalence provision for regulations and one for procedures. 
In addition, the concept of mutual recognition is not mentioned in the SPS Agreement. 
Another difference is that article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement makes it explicitly clear that 
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it is the exporting country that must demonstrate equivalence to the importing country¶s 
measures. Furthermore, the measures in focus for equivalence assessment are measures 
related to the ³appropriate level of SPS protection´. 
The objective of SPS measures is to protect animal, plant and human health and the 
measures must address specified types of corresponding SPS risks. This criterion is 
closely linked to the fact that SPS measures must have scientific justification on the 
basis of a health risk assessment. In contrast, there are no such preconditions for 
adopting TBT measures, and TBT measures may be adopted for multiple reasons. 
Legitimate TBT objectives are inter alia national security requirements, the prevention 
of deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety, animal or plant health, or 
the environment (article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement), but this list cannot be considered 
exhaustive. This implies that it could be easier to assess equivalence in relation to SPS 
measures insofar as these measures address a specific kind of objective (level of health 
protection). Moreover, acceptable levels of health protection are (in many cases) quite 
easy both to identify and to measure. 
Another difference is that we observe two substantially different elements in article 
4.1 of the SPS Agreement compared to articles 2.7 and 6.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
First, the wording is much stronger in the SPS Agreement, in which article 4.1 states 
that members ³shall accept´ measures as equivalent. In comparison, the TBT 
Agreement states that members should ³give positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent´ (2.7/regulations in the TBT Agreement) or ³shall ensure, whenever 
possible´ (6.1/conformity assessment procedures in the TBT Agreement).  
The other main difference is that while the SPS Agreement requires that the 
exporting member must give an ³objective demonstration´ of equivalence, the TBT 
Agreement is more vague, merely stating that the members accepting equivalence 
should be ³satisfied´ that the regulations of the other members adequately fulfil the 
objectives of their own regulations. 
Against this background we can conclude that the concept of equivalence has a 
stronger standing within the SPS Agreement than within the TBT Agreement. The 
assessment of equivalence with regard to SPS measures also seem to be more straight-
forward, since SPS measures addresses only one type of goal related to protection levels 
that may be quantified.  
How can these discrepancies in the recognition of equivalence between the two 
agreements be explained?  
Professor Dukgeun Ahn (2002) points to the different natures of SPS and TBT measures 
as the rationale behind the different emphasis on equivalence in the two agreements, in 
line with the arguments suggested above. A precondition for assessing equivalence is 
that the goals of regulations must be clarified and made explicit. Professor Ahn finds the 
concept of equivalence to better fit the nature of SPS measures, since SPS measures are 
defined by one goal only (to protect health) with a variety of possible measures. In 
contrast, he refers to the fact that TBT measures are adopted for various reasons and that 
the regulations are very specific, making it harder to find comparable rules and establish 
equivalence. In his opinion this makes equivalence less relevant for technical measures. 
Should we thus view equivalence as an important trade facilitating tool in relation to 
SPS measures, but an instrument with limited practical implications in relation to TBT 
measures?  
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It is clear that TBT measures are much more thematically diverse and that they can 
be adopted for a much wider range of objectives than SPS measures, making it harder to 
find comparable measures. An illustrating example of diversity of claimed TBT goals is 
the so called ³trout case´ between New Zealand and Canada. New Zealand argues 
conservation of recreational fishing as a cultural heritage and the value of this heritage 
for tourism as the basis for import restriction (as a technical regulation) on fresh, 
commercially caught trout from Canada (Veggeland et al. 2002). 
SPS measures are considered easier to quantify (with regard to the protection levels 
they address) than TBT measures. Further, SPS measures are also considered to be more 
internationally harmonised than TBT measures. This could make it an easier task to 
close the remaining gap of differences in the SPS area by way of equivalence 
recognition.  
Against this background, it may seem more complex to grasp the potential for 
equivalence recognition in the TBT area than in the SPS area. However, in specific 
sectors one may find comparable technical measures, e.g., in relation to food quality 
requirements designed to fulfil similar types of regulatory goals. It may also be noted 
that there is a trend towards defining quality measures in more general terms through 
performance requirement rather than by way of detailed specification, which may be 
helpful when considering equivalence as an approach to facilitating trade. An obvious 
task for further research would be to map potential sectors and product groups that 
could benefit from equivalence recognition. 
An argument that actually goes against the notion that equivalence easier fits SPS 
measures, is the fact that the SPS Agreement recognises the introduction of measures 
leading to a higher level of protection than would be achieved on the basis of 
international standards ± given there is scientific justification for the deviation (cf. 
article 3.3). It follows that in situations where trading partners have chosen significantly 
different protection levels, consultations on equivalence of SPS measures would not be 
very relevant even if it is easy to identify comparable sets of rules with the same kind of 
objectives. 
Both SPS and TBT measures shall be based on international standards. However, the 
way in which member states choose to implement standards in national regulations may 
create variations between national regulations for both types of measures. In addition, 
both agreements allow for measures to deviate from international standards under 
specific conditions, which in turn may lead to variations in the measures adopted by 
different countries (ref. article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement and article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement)6.  
This implies that in theory there should be a potential for facilitating trade for both  
TBT and SPS measures by recognition of equivalence, even if the process could be 
more demanding for TBT measures. It is an empirical question in what sectors and for 
what specific regulations and standards equivalence recognition is most relevant and 
useful. Thus, there is a need for empiricaly exploring these issues further. 
The next section contains some examples of different agreements involving 
equivalence and/or mutual recognition to show how these concepts are used in practice 
for TBT measures. 
                                                 
 6 For TBT measures, fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technical problems are 
mentioned as legitimate reasons for deviation from international standards in article 2.4. 
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In order to find relevant examples of equivalence and mutual recognition agreements, 
we have gone through notifications to the TBT committee. We have also searched the 
Internet to find agreements that are not notified to the TBT committee7, and we have 
made some enquiries to relevant agencies for further information.  
The general impression is that very few agreements involve recognition of the 
equivalence of TBT rules and standards. Our search resulted only in a few examples 
regarding standards. However, there are multiple examples from many different sectors 
of mutual recognition agreements of conformity assessment procedures.  
Another impression is that agreements on equivalence and mutual recognition seem 
most widespread in relation to different kinds of equipment and sectors like tele-
communications and medicine. This seems not to be the case for the food sector, even 
though we found some examples, e.g. in the fishery sector. There may of course exist 
relevant agreements not discovered by our relatively limited search, and here we only 
present a few examples of agreements for the sake of illustration. The examples we 
have chosen to highlight are either examples related to food or examples of general 
significance/not sector specific. However, some examples from other sectors are 
mentioned.  
In 1993, Canada and Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding leaving 
inspection with the exporting country without any additional inspection and analyses on 
                                                 
 7 Article 10.7 of the TBT Agreement requires members to notify agreements....´related to technical 
regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures which may have a significant effect on 
trade´. 
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arrival, on the basis of accepting each other¶s inspection systems as equivalent.8 The 
agreement only involves equivalence in relation to the assurance that the control and 
inspection agencies meet the requirements of the importing country (³purpose´, 
point 1). 
In 1996, Canada and New Zealand entered into an ³Equivalence arrangement on 
control measures for the safety and quality of fish and fishery products´. This agree-
ment refers to facilitation of bilateral trade as the main objective, while protecting 
public health and consumers from unwholesome fish and from false/mis-
leading/deceptive labelling practices. The description of the goals and the title of the 
agreement refer to both safety and quality issues, thereby being both SPS and TBT 
relevant. However, the agreement itself only includes an explicit reference to the SPS 
Agreement.  
The equivalence provision of the agreement (8.1) states that: ³Each Party will 
recognise as equivalent the other Party¶s inspection and control systems governing the 
processing, packaging, handling or export of fish and fishery products...´ (underlining 
by the author).  
Important benefits from the agreement are mutual acceptance of export certificates 
and no inspections or analyses of shipments on arrival as the main rule (7.3.A).  
Annex A of the agreement describes the process of equivalence assessment, 
stipulating assessment of the competent authorities with regard to, among others, 
structure, powers and performance, as well as legislation, procedures, standards and 
programs. The agreement also includes separate provisions on audits, transparency and 
exchange of information. However, it is clear that the agreement only involves 
equivalence with regard to the ³«.efficiency of the total program in meeting the 
requirements of the importing Party´(annex A, b2) (underling by the author). 
In 1997, Canada and Thailand established the agreement ³On equivalence of fish and 
fishery products inspection and control systems´. Under article 4 it is stated that: ³Each 
Party hereby recognises as equivalent the other Party¶s fish and fishery products 
inspection and control systems governing raw materials, holding, handling, 
transporting, processing, packaging, and trade in fish and fishery products....´. 
However, article 4.3 states that: ³Where differences exist in product standards and 
labelling requirements, the exporting Party will require the establishments identified in 
Annex III to comply with the product standards and labelling requirements of the 
importing Party´ (underlining by the author).  
The agreement with Thailand seems to be more detailed, particularly in giving a 
description of the criteria for recognition of equivalence of the inspection and control 
systems (Annex II). The description of criteria includes requirements in relation to the 
legislative framework, governmental structures, adequate resources/tools, appropriate 
implementation of mandate, training of inspectors and laboratory personnel, inspection 
and sampling plans, certification systems, enforcement history, identification of (fish 
processing) establishments, ability to perform audit procedures and verification of 
equivalence.  
It is interesting to notice that one of the requirements for the responsible authorities 
is to identify the main objectives addressed by their fish and fishery products inspection 
and control systems. The agreements specify that verification of equivalence may 
include side-by-side comparison, review of compliance history of products imported 
from the other Party and compliance audits. With regard to verification of equivalence 
each party should: ³...verify the equivalence of the other Party¶s fish and fishery 
                                                 
 8 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Inspection and Certification of Fish and Fishery 
Products between Australia and Canada, 28 June 1993. 
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products inspection and control system to meet import requirements´ (underlining by 
the author). 
It is also worthwhile mentioning that Canada has an arrangement of mutual 
recognition with Indonesia, established in 2002. This arrangement recognises the fish 
and fishery products inspection and control systems of the parties according to a 
specified procedure.9 The agreement only involves recognition of the adequacy of the 
other party¶s control system to meet import requirements. 
The agreements mentioned above can be found on the website of the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency: www.inspection.gc.ca/ 
In March 2002, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries recognised 
that the United States Department of Agriculture¶s national organic standard for the 
production, handling and processing of plant-based organic agricultural products meets 
the requirements of the Japanese agricultural standard. The recognition of U.S. organic 
labelling standards was made after determining that the U.S. grading system is 
equivalent to the grading system of organic products under the Japanese agricultural 
standard.10 
The Japanese recognition means that plant-based agricultural products certified to 
meet the U.S. organic standard can be labelled as organic and sold on the Japanese 
market (United States Department of Agriculture 2002). However, Japan could not 
accept three specified substances in organic products allowed under the U.S. organic 
standard and demanded a special compliance statement on the U.S. organic products for 
these substances. This means that Japan has only accepted the U.S. standards as 
partially equivalent. The U.S. will now consider banning of the three substances, so that 
producers only have to conform to one set of rules and avoid the demand for any 
additional documentation when exporting to Japan. 
Regarding organic labelling, it is also worthwhile mentioning that the EU Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91 recognises the concept of equivalence in relation to 
organic products from third countries (article 11.1). This means that third countries can 
develop their own organic food production and certification systems as long as they 
fulfil the objectives of EU regulations. A list of all the countries with equivalence status 
or mutual recognition agreements can be found in Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
94/92. 
At the international level, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements (IFOAM), established in 1992, has an accreditation programme ensuring 
equivalency of certification bodies worldwide. IFOAM check whether the bodies meet 
the IFOAM requirements for certification bodies and the IFOAM basic standards11. 
                                                 
 9³Arrangement on the Mutual Recognition of Fish and Fishery Products Inspection and Control 
Systems´ between The Canadian Food Inspection Agency and The Directorate General of Capture 
Fisheries of the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia, 7 March 2002. 
  
 10 The agreement is notified to the TBT committee: G/TBT/10.7/N/36. 
  
 11 In 1999, the Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted ³Guidelines for the Production, Processing, 
Labelling and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods´, aiding member countries to draw up their 
own rules on the basis of Codex principles taking account of specific national features. 
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In APEC (The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation), a multilateral arrangement is 
established called ³the APEC Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Conformity 
Assessment of Foods and Food Products´ consisting of one general umbrella arrange-
ment and one specific arrangement for implementation of sectoral arrangements.  
In sectoral arrangements the participants engage in a mutual recognition agreement 
(MRA) recognising that the conformity assessment procedures of the other(s) are 
equivalent, in terms of outcomes, to their own. As a result, products can be assessed 
prior to export as to their conformity with the importing countries¶ requirements. On 
this basis, the need to reassess the product prior to entry onto the market in the 
importing economy disappears. The legislative, regulatory and administrative require-
ments on safety, fitness of purpose and truth in labelling which apply in each of the 
participating members economies remains in force. This means that the food MRAs can 
involve both SPS and TBT measures.  
Phase I of the APEC arrangement encompasses mutual recognition of test reports, 
and Phase II is acceptance of product approvals. All APEC countries are now in phase I, 
and many countries are ready for phase II. 
APEC also encourages MRAs in relation to physical measurement standards along 
with MRAs between accreditation bodies for calibration/testing laboratories and for 
certification as well as MRAs on legal metrology. It follows that the APEC MRAs are 
established both in the voluntary and the regulated sectors. 
Accreditation means to recognise the competence of a body with regard to testing, 
certification and associated functions in order to reduce or eliminate the need for 
products to be re-tested in another country. Accreditation is established through an 
objective body that assesses and verifies that the conformity assessment activities and 
results are in accordance with international standards. 
Accreditation at the international level is established within the framework of the 
IAF (International Accreditation Forum) and the ILAC (International Laboratory 
Accreditation Cooperation). Within Europe, the parallel body is the EAA (European 
Cooperation for Accreditation). 
The primary function of the IAF is to develop a single worldwide program of 
conformity assessment certificates, which will promote the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers to trade. IAF¶s objectives include facilitating trade by establishing mutual 
recognition agreements based on the equivalence of accreditation programmes operated 
by accredited body members, verified through peer review among those accredited body 
members. 
Accreditation is used as an impartial means of assessing the competence of con-
formity assessment bodies. IAF provides the technical basis for the worldwide recog-
nition of the competence of the bodies accredited by its members. The concept is 
³tested or certified once ± accepted everywhere´. 
One result of this recognition is that purchasers, regulators and insurers who might 
have insisted on results accredited by their own national accreditation system, must 
accept results from other accredited sources. This facilitates the international acceptance 
of goods traded across borders.  
The Comitp International des Poids et Mesures (CIPM) (International Bureau of 
Weights and Measures) is a global body for measurement standards and calibration. In 
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1999, thirty-eight countries throughout the world signed an MRA established under the 
auspices of the CIPM. This MRA provides for the formal mutual recognition of national 
measurement standards and calibration capabilities, including measurement capabilities 
related to certified reference materials.  
The MRA established by CIPM will gradually replace formal bilateral or regional 
agreements recognising the equivalence of key national measurement standards and 
create a uniform global metrology system contributing to the removal of technical 
barriers to trade.  
We also found examples of mutual recognition agreements from other sectors. These 
include agreements for accepting test reports, certificates and marks of conformity 
established, inter alia, in the automotive industry, for chemicals, electrical equipment, 
medical services, mechanical equipment, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, pressure 
equipment, radio and telecommunication equipment and for recreational crafts. It should 
also be mentioned that the EU has entered into seven MRAs with third countries invol-
ving most of the sectors mentioned above (EU ± USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Israel, Japan and Switzerland). In addition, the EFTA countries (Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein) have agreed on MRAs with third countries like Australia and Canada, 
mutually recognising the results of conformity assessment activities related to, e.g., tele-
communications, electrical equipment and machinery. 
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In the introduction, harmonisation was pointed out as a well-known tool for facilitating 
trade. Moreover, harmonisation is generally considered to be the preferred and most 
effective tool for removing technical barriers to trade.  
However, achieving harmonisation is a very complex and lengthy process. In many 
cases, there are difficult technical and political circumstances that are hard to overcome. 
In many sectors, the potential for harmonisation is not very large, at least in a short-term 
perspective. The question then is what other means could be used as alternatives or 
supplements to harmonisation, in order to remove technical barriers to trade and 
facilitate trade? 
In this paper we have focused on equivalence and mutual recognition as two other 
tools for facilitation of trade. In the following, we shall try to sum up both the problems 
and the possibilities of using these tools in relation to TBT measures. 
The TBT Agreement does not give much guidance with regard to defining the concepts 
and how these tools could be used (the same is the case for the SPS Agreement). There 
are no authoritative documents describing the meaning of the concepts in detail. These 
concepts are thus often misunderstood and misused. This paper has been an attempt to 
get a clearer picture, but there are obvious needs for further work on equivalence and 
mutual recognition in relation to technical measures in relevant fora.  
In general, there seem to be no good reasons why equivalence and mutual 
recognition could not be just as relevant for TBT measures as for SPS measures. How-
ever, one problem is that TBT measures address a wide variety of different objectives 
that are not so easily compared and/or understood across national borders. In contrast, 
SPS measures only address goals related to health protection. It may also be easier to 
assess equivalence of SPS measures because the core issue is to compare the equiva-
lence of protection levels only.  
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Against this background, the difficulties that the broad scope of TBT objectives 
could cause in relation to equivalence should be subject for more thorough studies. A 
theoretical approach to answer how limiting this aspect really is would not be very 
efficient. One has to look at the actual situation in specific trade areas and for specific 
product categories, for instance in relation to product quality or labelling.  
Equivalence can be considered the ³the light-version´ of harmonisation. The result of 
equivalence agreements is that products can be placed on the markets as if they confor-
med to the same rules, even though the rules actually remain different. This is possible 
after establishing that the different rules have the same objective and that the effects of 
the rules lead to fulfilment of the same goals.  
To be able to agree on equivalence, it is clear that one precondition is a quite high 
degree of uniformity in relation to objectives and outcomes of regulations. It is also 
clear that the process of equivalence assessment in relation to rules and standards may 
be a quite complex and technical process that requires a great deal of time and 
resources. 
However, recognition of equivalence of standards and regulations must be seen as a 
useful supplement to the harmonsationefforts: ³It (equivalence) can also be useful when 
harmonisation has almost been achieved through voluntary international standards and 
equivalence would then step in to close the remaining gap, which is often rooted in the 
peculiarities of a country¶s administrative and legal structure, rather than in any 
objective difference on what needs to be regulated and how´(Petriccione 2000) 
(underlining by the author). 
Thus, equivalence recognition should be seen as a complementary tool to harmonisa-
tion and not as a ³competitor´. This implies that the concept may be worthwhile further 
consideration, especially by exploring the use and applicability of equivalence for TBT 
measures with regard to specific products/product categories.  
Mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures may seem to be an even 
more interesting tool to consider, since it can be an important aid to facilitate trade 
regardless of how far the process of harmonisation or recognition of equivalence of 
rules and standards has come. The benefits gained from getting product approval for 
exports from the exporting country are obvious both for the producers/exporting country 
and for the importing country. MRAs also seem to be a much more widespread and 
commonly used tool than equivalence of rules and standards. The role of MRAs for 
facilitating trade in specific sectors and product categories, inter alia, for the food trade, 
should be a subject for further studies. 
To be able to make better use of equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-
facilitating tools for TBT measures, it would be appropriate to do further work to clarify 
the concepts, collect examples and systematise practical knowledge of the use of 
equivalence and mutual recognition in different settings and product areas.  
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